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THE U.S.-CHINA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE
Paul Gewirtz*
My subject is the U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, a government-togovernment effort with which I was personally involved as a U.S. government
official. In discussing this Initiative, I hope to provide a little indirect light on two
broader matters that are far more important than the fate of one U.S. government
program: (1) What are the possibilities and prospects for legal reform in China?;
and (2) what role can foreign entities play, and what role is appropriate for foreign
entities to play, in the legal reform process in China?
Let me begin with a bit of personal memoir. I use that term with considerable
self-irony. I was basically a temp at the State Department, and temps do not do
memoirs. I am a career law professor at Yale Law School, but I took a leave of
absence from 1997 to 1998 to work at the U.S. Department of State in Washington,
D.C. For some time, I had peddled an idea in various venues that U.S. foreign
policy should focus more on legal reform in other countries. My argument was that,
if other countries' legal systems could be improved, a range of U.S. foreign policy
interests could be advanced: Legal reform could support economic development in
other countries, legal reform could advance human rights, legal reform could
improve the ability to combat global crime, and so forth. Therefore, I argued, U.S.
diplomacy and U.S. foreign assistance should focus more intensively on legal
reform than it had, and diplomacy and foreign assistance should be more closely
synchronized. The idea was hardly original with me, but it was timely for a variety
of reasons. Reasonably senior people in the State Department and the White House
thought it made sense, and a post at the State Department was created for me in
1997 to try to strengthen the Department's efforts along the lines I had been
suggesting.
China was the area of my greatest interest from the beginning, and I thought the
timing was favorable for China-related work. President Jiang Zemin of China had
already accepted President Bill Clinton's invitation that he visit the United States
later that year. Indeed, on my watch, President Clinton and President Jiang held
two Summit meetings. Summits are great action-forcing events as each side seeks
to have things to show for its efforts. Things that might otherwise take diplomats
* Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, The China Law Center,
Yale Law School. This is a slightly expanded version of remarks delivered at a Conference
on the "Rule of Law in China" at the College of William and Mary School of Law on
February 22, 2002. From 1997-98, the author was Special Representative for the
Presidential Rule of Law Initiative at the United States Department of State. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not represent official positions of the U.S.
government. I am grateful to the participants in Yale Law School's Workshop on Chinese
Legal Reform for their comments on an earlier draft.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:603

years to accomplish, or that might not be accomplished at all, can often be
accomplished rather quickly underthe liberating pressure to produce what are called
"Summit deliverables." And so it was with the so-called U.S.-China Rule of Law
Initiative.
I proposed to State Department and White House officials that we try to reach
a Summit agreement with the Chinese that our two countries would cooperate in the
legal field. As early as 1994, President Clinton had expressed "support for efforts
underway in China to promote the rule of law,"' but little concrete had occurred.
The upcoming Summit, I argued, created a new opportunity. Within a few weeks
of my arrival at the State Department, Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor,
told me to go to Beijing to see if I could negotiate something. It may sound a little
implausible, but that was what happened.
I pursued the Initiative with a variety of premises. Let me mention four of the
main ones.
First, I believed then, and I believe now, that legal reform in China is of great
importance to China and to the world. Legal reform can enhance economic
development, advance human rights, contribute to political reform, counter
corruption, and improve China's interactions with the international community, to
mention just a few things. Legal reform in China can be valuable in its own right
and can contribute to wider reforms.
Second, I believed then and believe now that China is serious about legal reform
in a variety of different areas, not just commercial law. After a long period of
devaluing law, China's leaders are placing considerable emphasis on the role of the
legal system in ensuring stable and sustainable social development. Significant
changes in the legal system have already taken place. Two statistics stand out to
me: In 1979 there were only two law schools in China; twenty years later there were
more than 200. In 1979 there were fewer than 3000 lawyers in China; twenty years
later there were over 100,000. During this same period, China enacted a very large
number of new laws and regulations, reconstructed a court system that now hears
over six million cases a year, and elevated the concept of "ruling the country
according to law" to a prominent ideological and constitutional place.
It is important to appreciate that the motives for legal reform in China are
complex and multi-faceted.
The role of legal reform in China's economic development is widely
recognized in China. China's leaders see developing its legal system as an
important element in its economic development by providing rules of the
game to guide transactions and institutions to enforce those rules. But there
are other motives as well.
U.S. Renews Most-Favored-NationTradeStatusforChina,5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
345, 347 (1994) (President Clinton's opening statement at a news conference, Washington,
D.C., May 26, 1994).
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*

Chinese leaders want to prevent the recurrence of abuses of the Cultural
Revolution, which affected many of them personally.
" They want to reign in wayward and arbitrary bureaucracies and local
governments.
" They want to strengthen China's ability to fight crime, including corruption
(at least on a selective basis).
* They want to respond to expanding rights-consciousness in the public.
This is not at all to say that they embrace U.S. conceptions of human
rights - far from it. Nor is it to deny that the Confucian tradition
downplays the idea of individual rights and sees conflict
resolution as less
about realizing rights and more about achieving compromise. However,
there is a clearly expanding rights-consciousness in Chinese society today
that the country's leadership cannot ignore.
* In a related vein, China's leaders recognize that they need to provide some
peaceful channels for the citizenry to express grievances at a time of great
social change and few democratic outlets.
• China's widening role in global markets and on the world stage has made
it more receptive to following international legal norms and to developing
legal arrangements that parallel those of other countries.
• Chinese leaders are also interested in legitimating their regime, both
domestically and internationally, and this too pushes them to develop
China's legal system to make it more fair and reliable and to give people at
least some sense of possible recourse for grievances.
These multiple purposes have made China receptive to legal reforms that are not
limited to the commercial area. For example, China has adopted an Administrative
Litigation Law2 that gives citizens the right to sue government officials for violating
the law; China's criminal procedure law has been amended to begin providing
greater protections for defendants;3 and a system of legal aid for the poor has been
established.4
I certainly do not want to overstate any of these advances. There are very
significant boundaries on the sorts of legal reforms that are possible within China's
current political system. Deficiencies remain great on most fronts, including
widespread corruption, poor professional training and limited independence among
judges, all too frequent torture and arbitrary detention by the police, and often
opaque and arbitrary bureaucratic action. In matters that involve political
2

Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of China (1989).
Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (1979) (amended 1996);

JONATHAN HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM?: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE LAW (1996).

' See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman, LegalAid and Public InterestLaw in China,34 TEX.
INT'L. L.J. 211 (1999).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:603

dissidents, all bets are off. Even with these serious constraints, however, my second
large premise was, and remains, that there are significant possibilities for legal
reform in China.
The third premise I had in developing the Rule of Law Initiative was that, if the
approach was framed properly, China would be receptive to working with
foreigners, including U.S. experts, on legal reform issues - seeing this as a way to
strengthen their own efforts with ideas, expertise and comparative experience that
foreign experts could provide. In fact, the Chinese had been working on legal
reform issues with foreigners long before the U.S.-China government-togovernment Initiative was conceived. We were coming in on the shoulders of
institutions like the Ford Foundation, which had conducted legal reform work for
years, and a pioneering generation of American law school professors who worked
closely with Chinese counterparts. Of course there are distinctive sensitivities when
the U.S. government is directly involved. Still, I thought there was a good chance
the Chinese would be receptive to the Initiative if we used language and rhetoric
carefully - if we phrased this as a "cooperative" initiative, not one responding to
U.S. complaints, and if we characterized the work as "law" and "legal expertise,"
rather than emphasizing the more highly charged phrases of "human rights" and
"political reform." I should add, however, that I always believed that the Chinese
side understood that at its core this Initiative was an extension of efforts within the
United States to improve human rights in China.
The fourth premise I had was that an initiative like this could build positive
channels of communication, deepen mutual understanding between the two
countries, and develop webs of people-to-people relationships in ways that could
nurture the entire U.S.-China relationship. It is not surprising, perhaps, that
virtually all the other issues addressed at the 1997 Summit (Summit diplomats call
them "baskets") were matters in which one side was complaining to the other about
something. We certainly had things to complain about, but I was convinced then
and I remain convinced now that a relationship with a country like China needs to
be more than mutual complaints. I saw this Initiative as the creation of a positive
new channel between the two countries.
I arrived in Beijing as a novice diplomat. National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger had already raised my idea of a law-related initiative with his Chinese
counterpart, but it had been touched on very briefly, and the Chinese had been only
mildly encouraging. A door had been opened, but it is probably fair to say that no
one in either government other than me had an intense commitment to this "basket,"
and time was short. As I arrived at the Chinese Foreign Ministry building with
political officer Woo Lee from the U.S. Embassy in China (now our Consul-General
in Fukoka, Japan), a large sofa and some other furniture were being carried out the
front door. We stood and waited to let the men pass. "They're moving," Woo Lee
said to me, explaining the surreal scene. Indeed, this was moving day at the old
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Foreign Ministry building, the last day at the old headquarters before the new
Foreign Ministry building opened for business. I remember at that moment trying
to interpret Woo Lee's phrase metaphorically - China was "moving" forward, and
things like legal reform were real possibilities - but the meeting at thenear-empty
Ministry building resisted metaphoric transfiguration. Among other things,
although I had rehearsed the meeting in my head and on my notepad many times
over, I had not taken account of the seating arrangement. As only a novice China
hand could have done, I had imagined sitting across a table from my Chinese
counterpart, whereas in fact we were seated side by side in club chairs, each of us
facing forward into the room unless we turned to look at the other - the customary
architecture of Chinese meetings. It was uncomfortable, and looking at notes was
difficult. My counterpart, the head of the "North American desk" at the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, was clearly most interested in trying to figure what our motives
were in proposing the Initiative. He was moderately encouraging on the substance
of the Initiative, but very far from committal. I left the meeting aware that the
Chinese would need time to digest what we were proposing, unclear what the next
diplomatic step would be, and uncertain whether quick enough progress could be
made to achieve a Summit "deliverable."
What followed were many more meetings and exchanges, both with the Chinese
and with U.S. colleagues. I met both with Chinese government officials and also
with many others in the Chinese legal community, especially Chinese law
professors who were thinkers and doers in legal reform work. Thus, at the same
time that I was trying to move the Initiative forward diplomatically, I was seeking
to deepen my knowledge of the Chinese legal reform process, to develop and
deepen relationships with Chinese experts actually involved in legal reform, and
thus to lay the groundwork for actual cooperative projects with Chinese
counterparts should a Summit agreement be reached.
My "identity" was often a subject of interest to the Chinese. Chinese
government officials were always trying to figure out how senior I was and how
influential I was. Part of this was simply their effort to figure out who my
appropriate counterpart on the Chinese side should be, for the Chinese are
meticulous in trying to maintain this sort of parity. But their curiosity seemed
broader than that. My State Department title was an opaque original. They knew
that I was not a professional diplomat and that I had been a professor at Yale Law
School - but the idea of a professor taking a leave of absence for a few years to go
into the government is not a typical Chinese phenomenon and not one they could
easily interpret. I did not seek to hide that I was a professor on leave from Yale in
my discussions with Chinese government officials because I hoped that they might
think of me somewhat differently from the professional U.S. diplomats with whom
they often had rancorous exchanges. They saw me emerge in the Summit
discussions rather suddenly, so they assumed that I had high-level support. They

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:603

knew that President Clinton and his wife had gone to Yale Law School and were
curious about my connection to the Clintons.
In my efforts to get a Summit agreement with the Chinese and to keep the
support of other U.S. diplomats working on the Clinton-Jiang Summit, what I lacked
in diplomatic experience, I made up for in tenaciousness. No one, not even 1,could
rank a new law-related Initiative as among the highest priorities for the Summit, and
there were many moments when it could easily have fallen off the table. Still, I did
everything I could to prevent this from happening. I worked every angle I could to
keep the Initiative on the minds of those with overall responsibility for the Summit;
I relentlessly pushed them to promote the Initiative with the Chinese and with others
in the U.S. government; I made sure that I was included in key State Department or
White House meetings both to be visible and to have the opportunity to advance the
Initiative; I sought to be included in key U.S.-Chinese meetings, even without any
speaking role, so that my visibility would remind my U.S. colleagues to push the
Initiative and so that the Chinese would not doubt that I was a player; I pushed the
Chinese to make decisions; I pushed my point of view in writing, over the
telephone, and in person with everyone; and if I was met with temporizing or less
than complete success, I kept pushing. Not surprisingly, I tried to keep control of
every aspect of the Initiative as much as I could, but I also recognized, thank
goodness, that decisions and actions concerning the Initiative would sometimes be
taken when I was not present, so that I needed to broaden the sense of ownership of
the Initiative within the government.
There were many bumps in the road to the Summit-agreement, but the end result
was that an agreement on a new Initiative was announced as part of the Joint
Statement that was issued at the end of the 1997 Summit: China and the United
States would open up a new channel of cooperation to assist legal reforms in China.
This could not have been achieved without the participation and help ofmany many
others - including not only senior figures in the State Department, White House,
and U.S. Embassy in Beijing, but also my day-to-day deputy Stephen Higginson (on
loan from the Department of Justice) and consultant Jonathan Hecht, one of the
finest scholars of Chinese law in the United States and an innovator in U.S.-China
legal exchanges long before the government-to-government Initiative was a gleam
in my eye.
The relevant portion of the Joint Statement reads as follows:
Cooperationin the Fieldof Law
The United States and China agree that promoting cooperation in the
field of law serves the interests and needs of both countries....
... Recognizing the importance the United States and China each
attaches to legal exchanges, they intend to establish ajoint liaison group

2003]

THE U.S.-CHINA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE

to pursue cooperative activities in this area. These may include
exchanges of legal experts; training ofjudges and lawyers; strengthening
legal information systems and the exchange of legal materials; sharing
ideas about legal assistance; consulting on administrative procedures;
and strengthening commercial law and arbitration.
As part of this program of legal cooperation, China's Minister of
Justice will visit the United States in November 1997 at the invitation of
the U.S. Attorney General.5
I want to point our several things about the Joint Statement:
First, notice the caption. This is not called the "Rule of Law Initiative"
although it continues to be referred to as such. We had indeed proposed to the
Chinese that the Initiative be called "Cooperation on the Rule of Law," but the
Chinese would not go along. This was, and should remain, a cautionary and
sobering reminder that foundational ideas remain in dispute within China, and that
the "rule of law" remains a contested ideal and is still contending for preeminence
with phrases such as "rule by law" and "ruling the country according to law."6
Indeed, the phrase "rule of law" has been used to mean a variety of different things
in the West, ranging from a narrow notion of "procedural regularity," to a notion
that the government is constrained by law, to a notion that includes a number of
substantive rights. I think that the Chinese negotiators recognized that to use the
phrase "rule of law" in the Joint Statement might suggest things that the leadership
in China does not accept. The bottom line is that we accepted the blander label:
"Cooperation in the Field of Law."7 More generally, we did not formally agree with
the Chinese about our goals for the Initiative; we did not agree that our goal was to
advance the rule of law in China; and we did not agree on a concept of the rule of
law that we could each embrace. We agreed to do things, not why we were doing
things.
A second thing to notice about the Joint Statement is the scope of what we
agreed to do. However bland the Initiative's caption, the areas of programmatic
agreement were broad and meaty. The agreement covered judicial training, legal
assistance for the poor, administrative law, and the catchall "exchanges of legal
experts" in every field - and I knew from the detailed discussions that we had
already had that the Chinese were ready for cooperative projects in a wide variety
of areas, including quite sensitive ones and ones that would seek to advance at least
some elements of even the broadest Western conception of the "rule of law." It has
-

Joint United States-China Statement, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1680, 1683 (Oct.
29, 1997).
6 For an excellent discussion of the concept of the rule of law in the Chinese context, see
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW

7 Joint United States-China Statement, supra note 5, at 1683.

(2002).
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been suggested that the "strategy" of the Initiative was first to promote legal
reforms in the commercial area that might then "spread beyond economic
transactions to other areas" and plant seeds that would "strengthen the hand of
reformers in China who want to push for legal reforms in other areas." 8 But in fact,
from the very beginning, the Initiative's explicit focus was much broader than
commercial law. Indeed, as reflected in the Joint Statement itself, the Initiative
actually emphasized areas of cooperation that did not have a commercial law focus.
Third, consider the first sentence: "The United States and China agree that
promoting cooperation in the field of law serves the interests and needs of both
countries." 9 When I drafted this sentence and sent it to the White House, a White
House official wanted to take it out. This is just rhetoric, I was told: The Chinese
are the ones always trying to put rhetoric into agreements, and the U.S. side resists
this, so we should not be in a position of pushing for rhetoric ourselves. I disagreed
and pushed back. Why? Here rhetoric was substance. Indeed, the biggest
contribution of the Initiative, I thought, was that President Jiang Zemin was blessing
cooperation with United States experts on legal matters. For President Jiang to
affirm that cooperation with U.S. legal experts "serves the interests and needs" of
China would provide strong protective cover to legal reformers in China who are
looking to U.S. experience and expertise as a source of ideas that could potentially
be transplanted to China. In earlier times, such looking outward and consorting
with U.S. experts might have raised questions in China, particularly because legal
issues often touch upon matters that are "sensitive" domestically. Reformers in
China would be comforted, encouraged, and even emboldened by an affirmation
from China's leader that looking to U.S. legal expertise "serves the interests and
needs" of China. The sentence stayed in our draft, and the Chinese side accepted
it.
Fourth, the Joint Statement provided for the establishment of a "joint liaison
group to pursue cooperative activities in this area.""0 This was a Chinese addition,
and not one I particularly liked, but it is a fairly typical element of bilateral
agreements. Some mechanism typically needs to be provided to implement an
agreement, and establishing a "joint liaison group" is one way to provide a structure
to keep the government-to-government exchanges moving forward. Nothing
specific about the composition and role of this "joint liaison group" was indicated
in the Joint Statement, so it might seem altogether innocuous. But the downside of
including this in the Summit agreement soon became clear. On the Chinese side
this structure was under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
' Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and
Prospects of US.-Sponsored 'Rule of Law'Reform Projects in the People's Republic of
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 78 (2000).
9 Joint United States-China Statement, supra note 5, at 1683.
10 Id.
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Establishing such an entity on the Chinese side that would manage this Initiative ran
two interrelated risks: First, that some of the more adventuresome projects that we
might develop with particular adventuresome Chinese entities - projects that could
go forward if they were not highly visible - might be blocked or deterred if they
had to be screened and approved by some central "joint liaison group"; and second,
there was the risk that this "joint liaison group" on the Chinese side might evolve
into a kind of central clearinghouse that started monitoring "cooperation in the field
of law" unrelated to the new government-to-government Initiative, including efforts
between U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their Chinese
counterparts that had long preceded our new Initiative.
I was quite concerned about this. Following the Summit, there was no way to
avoid establishing and working through a "joint liaison group" process to some
extent, but I followed a two-track approach. In addition to attending to the joint
liaison group process, I actively pursued projects and counterparts outside of the
joint liaison group process, and I tried to sew up various projects before the joint
liaison group got into the picture. At the same time, the Chinese side pushed for us
to adopt a "Memorandum ofUnderstanding" about the structure and role of thejoint
liaison group, and that became an extended and complex process. The main areas
of contention were (1) who should be on the joint liaison group from each side; and
(2) what the role of the joint liaison group should be. The Chinese wanted
representatives from a large number of different governmental entities; I wanted the
process to be as simple as possible and favored having thejoint liaison group bejust
a Department of State-Ministry of Foreign Affairs entity. We compromised by
providing that "[t]he JLG [Joint Liaison Group] will include representatives of the
U.S. Department of State and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
representatives of other government departments and state organs as each side
determines."'"
The stickier matter concerned the joint liaison group's role. This took months
of negotiation. We ended up with just a few sentences that achieved our main
objectives: (1) limiting the joint liaison group to "guiding," "facilitating" and
"reporting back" functions, not approving or disapproving particular projects; and
(2) making clear that the joint liaison group had no role with respect to legal
cooperation projects unrelated to the government-to-government Initiative. 2 In the
" Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of a Joint Liaison
Group on Cooperation in the Field of Law (May 19, 1998).
12 The JLG will provide a mechanism for generally guiding the Summit Initiative,
facilitating the effective and efficient implementation of activities which both
sides agree to include in the Initiative, and reporting back to the Presidents of the
United States and China about the progress of the Initiative. Both sides
recognize that within the six categories and in other areas there have been and
will continue to be cooperative legal activities outside the Initiative that serve the
interests and needs of both countries.
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end, the joint liaison group played a quite limited role.
Much of my work on the Initiative following the October 1997 Summit
involved developing various specific Initiative activities that could be announced
at the second Clinton-Jiang Summit that was held in China in June 1998. A crucial
development occurred only two weeks after the first Summit, when then-Minister
of Justice (now Supreme People's Court President) Xiao Yang made a longpostponed visit to the United States. Xiao had been invited to the United States by
Attorney General Janet Reno more than a year previously. However, his visit
occurred at a time when the Attorney General was facing criticism for how she was
handling allegations that Chinese officials had made contributions to President
Clinton's reelection campaign; Justice Minister Xiao's visit put a further
uncomfortable spotlight on this, 3 and U.S. Justice Department officials met with
him only briefly. Over at the State Department, however, we saw Minister Xiao's
visit as a unique opportunity to develop the new Initiative. With no resistance from
anywhere else in the U.S. government, I planned most of the Minister's activities
while he was in the United States, met with him extensively, and accompanied him
everywhere for four days, shaping virtually his entire trip to advance the new
Initiative. The good will and concrete plans that I developed with Xiao Yang during
his visit gave the Initiative an important new advocate within the Chinese
government, one who arranged several of the most significant early activities under
the Initiative.
At least as important were a series of trips that I took to China between the two
Summits, including a Summit planning visit with Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright during which she participated in several law-related events (including a
speech at the National Judges College and a meeting with Xiao Yang in his new
post as Supreme People's Court President). During my visits, I gave particular
attention to various law professors in China who were working on legal reform
issues, believing that these professors had both the independence and the originality
to do the most innovative thinking and also were respected and influential within
official circles. A number of reform minded senior scholars such as Professor Ying
Songnian and Professor Chen Guangzhong had put together Research Groups
composed of leading scholars and selected reform-minded officials in their fields
to develop and draft reform ideas. They seemed like ideal potential partners for
projects with U.S. experts who might assist them in assessing relevant foreign
examples and experience in connection with their work.
In addition, I made vigorous efforts within the United States to explain the
Initiative, to persuade others of its importance, and to encourage entities and
individuals both inside and outside the government to become involved (or more
Id.

13 See

Reno Asks Chinese Official for Help in Finance Probe, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
1997, at A9.
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involved) in work to help advance legal reform in China. I sought to involve U.S.
parties in particular projects that I was developing and also to encourage them to

develop or expand their own work.
In late May and early June 1998, after developing a number of specific Initiative
projects that could be announced at the Summit, I accompanied President Clinton
to China. In public life there is no activity to compare with a presidential Summit
visit. During a Summit, the President acts as representative of the whole country

and as a world leader, not as a controverted if preeminent figure in ongoing
domestic political struggles. The special status of the United States is foregrounded
and felt constantly. The President's party lives in a world within a world, moving
along with insular complexity and energy, and with domestic bureaucratic and
personal barriers among delegation members temporarily lowered because of
compressed space and time and a focused common purpose. The excitement and
the tension of the presidency feels different on foreign shores, with the sense of
scale both augmented (the stakes are openly global) and contracted (our government
is operating out of hotel rooms).
The Rule of Law Initiative was hardly the centerpiece of the Summit, but it
received very considerable attention. The President discussed it on many occasions.
The First Lady made a highly publicized visit to a women's legal rights center in
Beijing and the Secretary of State visited with lawyers at a legal aid center in
Shanghai. The "deliverable" for the Summit was the announcement of a variety of
initial Initiative projects. These included a symposium on the legal protection of
human rights; a conference of U.S. and Chinese law deans to explore expanded
cooperation on legal education; a cooperative project on administrative law;j udicial
exchanges and judicial training seminars; cooperative efforts on legal aid for the
poor, beginning with a symposium in Beijing; a program to translate American law
books into Chinese; a commitment by the American Bar Association to undertake
a program of legal cooperation with its Chinese counterparts; a program to train
arbitrators; and exchanges on securities regulation, electronic commerce, and
corporate law (the latter was part of a Department of Commerce program).'
Significantly, these were largely activities that I arranged to be undertaken on the
U.S. side by entities outside the government, both because that was where the legal
expertise to pursue the projects was and because the State Department did not have
more than a trivial amount of funds to run these projects.
There was considerable n:edia interest in the Initiative. At a press conference
in Beijing to describe and discuss the Initiative, I spoke of it as "a broad new
" Press Release, Office ofCommunications, The White House, Fact Sheet: Achievements
of U.S.-China Summit (June 27, 1998), 1998 WL 354254; Press Release, Office of the Press
Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing by Paul Gerwirtz [sic], State Department, and
Mark Gearan, Director of the Peace Corps (June 29, 1998), at http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/
New/China/I 9980629-809i .html.
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channel [of cooperation] with the Chinese which we think is very significant and
holds promise - at least promise - for producing some long-term benefits in
improving legal institutions in China in a way that affects many aspects of life.""
"I want to emphasize that this is a long-term effort, it's a difficult effort," I said,
"but one with, I think, real promise."' 6 There were a few tough questions from the
press - for example, one reporter asked "Would you explain how you ensure that
your effort doesn'tjust make the Chinese legal system more efficient at dispensing
unfair or brutal punishments to people?"' 7 But the general response to the Initiative
was extremely positive. Anthony Lewis of The New York Times wrote an op-ed
column in the Times praising the Initiative and saying that "it has the potential to
be an engine of change in China." 8
The most important events of the 1998 Summit in China were two meetings
between President Clinton and President Jiang, a joint press conference with
Presidents Clinton and Jiang that was broadcast live in China, and a high profile
speech with question/answer session by President Clinton at Beijing University and when this last event was over, everyone in President's party relaxed, even
though visits to Shanghai and Hong Kong lay ahead. We moved from the Beijing
University auditorium into an adjacent courtyard to wait for the President to come
out. The weather was sultry and blazingly sunny. A large crowd of Chinese
students had gathered and cheered us boisterously with broad smiles and great
enthusiasm. All of the official Summit events had gone well, and we Americans felt
a huge sense of release and satisfaction. Everyone talked, laughed, waved, took
pictures - American and Chinese alike. The heat was overwhelming, the student
enthusiasm gleefully spontaneous, our own sense of release profound, our delight
at seeing the Chinese students obvious - and as the sun and sweat poured over us,
it felt as if the United States and China were friends forever. The President came
into the courtyard, to renewed cheers, and he caught the mood immediately and
spun it onward. There in the courtyard, with all official poses relaxed, our own
unguarded humanness and that of Chinese became an insistent affirmation of our
common life on the planet. Sobering realities would reemerge soon enough, of
course, but the sense of possibility in international relations - and perhaps more
broadly as well - is sustained by moments like what we all experienced that early
afternoon, for me the most powerful and memorable moments of the Summit.
Shortly thereafter, I returned to Yale. Significant further progress on the
Initiative was difficult in the subsequent period, even though people of great ability
took over my portfolio, largely because Congress refused to provide funding
assistance for work to advance the rule of law in China. Funding became caught up
1S Id.
16

Id.

11id.
S Anthony Lewis, The Engine of Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,1998, at Al 1.
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in the complex and often harsh Congressional politics concerning China. More
precisely, Congress refused to lift existing legislative prohibitions on the use of
Foreign Assistance Act 9 money for China,"0 and Congress failed to appropriate any
funds specifically earmarked for legal cooperation with China, so the U.S.
government had only very small pockets of money with which to do things.
Although significant preparatory work for follow-up activities was done at the State
Department, no coordinated legal reform strategy or program could emerge without
money to back it up.
Some have suggested that this means that the Initiative failed. 2' I completely
disagree. The main goals of the Initiative were to secure Jiang Zemin's blessing for
this kind of cooperation, which would open new doors in China, to increase
attention to this work and understanding of its importance, and to promote more
work being done. Those goals were accomplished. Precise causal linkages are
difficult to sort out, of course, but more doors in China are certainly now open for
this work than in 1997. More attention is being paid to this work. And there is now
significantly more activity by U.S. NGOs in China and more funds from
foundations and other donors now available for this work.22 As far as government
funding goes, the critics have used a much too narrow and impatient time frame.
It is true that Congress did not appropriate money immediately. But because of the
continued efforts of people both inside and outside the government, in 2002
legislation was signed appropriating $10,000,000 for programs concerning
democracy and the rule of law in China,23 and those funds are now being allocated.
A whole new phase in the U.S. Government's role is beginning.
In assessing the Rule of Law Initiative, success or failure needs to be appraised
Foreign Assistance Act of 196 1, Pub. L. No. 87-195,75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431k (2000)).
20 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(0(1) (2000) (prohibiting nonmedical assistance to
Communist countries, including the People's Republic ofChina); Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-429, app. A §
523, 114 Stat. 1900, 1900A-29 (explicitly prohibiting assistance to the People's Republic of
China).
21 See Stephenson, supranote 8, at 71-72 (quoting anonymous interviewees).
22 The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations has compiled a "Rule of Law
Database" that lists numerous U.S. entities undertaking programs related to Chinese legal
reform.
Nat'l Comm. on U.S.-China Relations, Rule of Law Database, at
http://www.ncuscr.org/Resources/Rule of Law/rolcover.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
Many of these programs were established or expanded in the time period after the first
Clinton-Jiang Summit meeting, in some cases with explicit linkage to the Summit agreement
and in other cases with some indirect linkage likely.
23 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-115, § 526(a), 115 Stat. 2118, 2147 (authorizing not less than $10
million assistance "to support democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the People's
Republic of China").
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on a somewhat broader time frame than the critics suggest. This is a point generally
true of China. All of us often feel frustration that China is not changing as quickly
as we would like, and we become upset that many disturbing things about China
have not changed much at all. But in the sweep of world history, the twenty-four
years since Deng Xiaoping's opening up began is just a momentary blip, a tiny unit
of time - and there are few if any large countries throughout world history that
have ever changed for the better at a faster pace than China has changed during this
period.
More personally, my State Department work changed my professional life. As
the saying goes, I caught the China bug big-time. In 1999, a year after I returned to
Yale Law School, Jonathan Hecht and I established The China Law Center there.
In addition to a research and teaching mission, the core of the Center's work is to
try to support China's legal reform process by undertaking a variety of cooperative
projects with legal experts in China on key legal reform issues. The Center
typically assembles a group of top U.S. experts in a particular field to work in depth
and over a period of time with Chinese counterparts. These experts might be an
academic group, a government entity, or a joint academic-government group that
is developing a legal reform proposal, actual legislation, or a scholars' draft of
legislation. The Center's projects are illustrative, Ithink, ofthe kind ofwork foreign
institutions can do with Chinese counterparts these days.
Let me mention just a few of our projects to give you an idea of the kind of
work that is being done. 4
• We are working with both an academic group and a group at the National
People's Congress on China's first criminal evidence law, which would
address such important issues as the establishment of a right to silence
during police interrogations, the treatment of illegally obtained evidence at
trial, and the wider use of witnesses at trial.
" We are working with an academic group on ideas for strengthening China's
Administrative Litigation Law, the important law that gives Chinese
citizens limited rights to sue government agencies and officials who violate
the law.
" We are working with the Shanghai courts on trial procedure reforms.
• We are working with leading academics and others to develop proposals for
replacing or fundamentally reforming the system of reeducation through
labor, one of the most serious human rights problems in China.
" We are working with both the Supreme People's Court and an academic
group on developing ideas for structural reforms of the Chinese judiciary
to help bring about greaterjudicial independence and professionalism and
For a fuller description of The China Law Center, see the Center's website at
http://www.yale.edu/chinalaw (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
24
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to reduce local protectionism by local courts.2"
" We are working with an academic group, the State Council's Office of
Legislative Affairs (OLA), and the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) in their
efforts to draft new legislation reforming the licensing system in China.
The legislation seeks to give greater scope to the market and individual
initiative by reducing the number of economic activities requiring
government permission and by increasing the predictability and
transparency of licensing procedures.
• We are working with OLA to assist its drafting of a fair credit reporting law
to promote the development of a personal consumer credit system in China
and to improve "social trust."
* We are working with the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC and
an academic group in their efforts to draft China's first tort law.
* We are working with the Shanghai Municipal Government and other legal
experts to assist in developing a new approach to professional and business
associations, to allow them to be more independent, self-funded, and selfregulating interest groups instead of extensions of the government
bureaucracy.
• We are working with OLA to develop procedures for public hearings and
other forms of public participation in administrative rulemaking.
* We are working with various Chinese legal scholars to explore short-term
and long-term ideas for developing a system of constitutional review in
China.
0 We are working with a number of different Chinese law schools to help
them establish the first-ever clinical legal education programs in China.
While these projects are ongoing and it is too early to assess the impact of such
cooperative work definitively, there is no doubt that we have at least introduced the
Chinese to new ideas and new approaches to the problems they are addressing and
that our Chinese counterparts have been intensely engaged in the cooperative work
we are undertaking.
As I reflect back on my experience in the government and on the continuing
work that I am doing on legal reform issues through our China Law Center, what
insights or lessons do I take away? From the beginning, I have been very aware that
there was an active "Law and Development" movement in the 1960s and 1970s, and
many of its practitioners and theorists ended up disillusioned and estranged.2 6 I
For a discussion of the some of the issues, see Paul Gewirtz, Independence and
Accountability of Courts, 24 GLOBAL LAW REv. 7 (2002), available both in Chinese (as
published in China) and in English at http://chinalaw.law.yale.edu/html/publications.htm.
26 See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wis. L.
5
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have also been aware of the long history of China's resistance to outside efforts to
influence its development, chronicled by my colleague Jonathan Spence in his early
book To Change China.2 Can another wave of disillusionment and estrangement
be avoided? No one can be sure, but here are some things I suggest we all keep in
mind as we think about deeper engagement with China's legal reform process:
1. There is no one true path for outsiders to take in trying to promote change in
China. Different kinds of efforts make sense. Cooperation with the Chinese on
legal reform was never intended to replace other human rights policies, and it
should not. It is right to complain to China and to put pressures on China to change
its policies that violate international human rights norms. But there is also an
important role for those who engage China and work closely with Chinese
reformers to make progress where progress can be made. My own view is that the
two approaches reenforce each other, and suggestions that one must choose between
the two approaches are misguided.
2. It is crucial to understand the substantial obstacles to legal reform that exist
in China to avoid exaggerated expectations and unrealistic recommendations. Many
of these obstacles derive from basic political arrangements (such as the role of the
Communist Party or the lack of a free press) or from deeply ingrained ideological
and cultural beliefs (such as a belief that courts are like other administrative organs
rather than distinctive kinds of institutions or a view that law is basically an
instrument of governing rather than a restraint on government). Specific legal
reform efforts cannot hope to address those framing arrangements and
REv. 1062 (1974). For a contemporary criticism ofthe Trubek & Galanter article, see Robert
B. Seidman, The Lessons of Self-Estrangement: On the Methodology of Law and
Development, in I RESEARCH INLAW AND SOCIOLOGY I (Rita James Simon ed., 1978). For
more recent assessments of law and development, see, e.g., THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING
DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 157-87 (1999); Amy L. Chua, Markets,
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE
L.J. 1 (1998); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999). For discussions of law and
development in the specific context of China, see, e.g., Taming the Dragon: Can Legal
Reform Foster Respect for Human Rights in China?: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec.
Comm'n on China, 107th Cong. 26-29 (Comm'n Print 2002) (prepared statement of
Jonathan Hecht, Deputy Director & Senior Research Fellow, The China Law Center, Yale
Law School), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/041102/index.php; STANLEY
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); William P. Alford,
Exporting "The Pursuit of Happiness," 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (2000) (reviewing
CAROTHERS, supra); William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural
Revolution Project of Legal Construction, II CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193 (1999);
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deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and
Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179
(1999); Stephenson, supra note 8.
27 JONATHAN D.

(1980).

SPENCE, To CHANGE CHINA: WESTERN ADVISERS IN CHINA, 1620-1960
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understandings directly, but true legal reformers can neither ignore them nor accept
them. Foreign experts invite their own disillusionment, and certainly look foolish,
when they propose specific reforms that simply ignore or wish away the framing
obstacles. The challenge is to find the targets of opportunity within the
constraints - an effort that not all idealists find congenial.
3. The basic goal of foreign efforts should be to increase the capacity of reformoriented individuals in China to be effective in their own work. They are the ones
who will be bringing about the reform, not the foreign experts. The only way to be
effective in this business is to work with the right Chinese counterparts, but figuring
out who those are is not easy. None of this requires that the foreign expert take
simply a reactive approach - Chinese reformers are definitely interested in
normative and practical suggestions from foreigners as well as their technical
knowledge - but it does mean that the appropriate mind set you should have is that
you are assisting Chinese reformers in doing their work, not coming in as a great
savior.
4. At least as a priority, foreign efforts to assist China's legal development
should focus on legal institutions in China, not just substantive law. These key
institutions include the courts, the administrative bureaucracies, the law schools,
and the legal profession. The reason is that improvements in institutions can have
beneficial effects cutting across many different fields of substantive law. A
corollary is that efforts need to focus more on implementation of laws, not just the
drafting of new laws. By focusing on the courts and the administrative
bureaucracies, attention is focused more readily on how laws are implemented, not
just how they are drafted. This also suggests that we need to focus not only on
those official entities that make and apply the law, but also on those in China who
can demand that the law serve them better - the slowly emerging civil society in
China, including but not limited to universities, the practicing bar, associations, and
the sometimes surprising Chinese media. Attention to the demand side of legal
reform also makes it more likely that issues of social inequality will be addressed
in the legal reform process.
5. The focus of this work is almost always incremental change, and one has to
accept that. Over time, cumulative incremental changes may yield foundational
change - for example, a transformation in the role of courts in Chinese society, or
basic changes in the way that people think about law both within the legal culture
and outside of it. But incremental change also has risks. We have seen this, for
example, with the criminal procedure reforms of 1996. These amendments
introduced seemingly valuable incremental reforms in the trial court's role in
criminal cases. For example, prior to these amendments the trial court received a
full "file" from the prosecutor, making it more likely that the trial court would
prejudge many cases before the actual trial. To reduce prejudgment and to try to
make the actual trial a more significant arena, the 1996 amendments limited what
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was given to the court before trial. But there was an unintended consequence.
Because the full "file" given to the court was made available to defendants a week
before their trial, defendants received rather extensive notice of the prosecutor's
evidence against them. By reducing what was in the file that went to the judge, the
amendments also deprived defendants of that information; and because the 1996
reforms were only partial and incremental, and did not introduce an alternative
system of pretrial discovery for defendants, defendants arguably ended up worse off
than they had been prior to the reforms.
6. The modalities of the cooperative work are important. In-depth and longterm projects are far more valuable than one-shot conferences or "study tours." Indepth exchanges are necessary for the Chinese to gain more than a superficial
understanding of foreign experience and to explore with foreign experts the
relevance of the foreign experience for China. Similarly, for foreign experts to be
truly useful, they must develop an understanding ofthe Chinese context so that they
can shape their presentations to that context and address pivot points in Chinese
debates; to do that also takes time. In-depth and long-term exchanges also build
trust, another key element in this kind of cooperative work. Interactive discussion
is far more valuable than lecturing and exchanging large amounts of written
material, and creating real interaction requires both time and trust. In my
experience, the most successful cooperative projects proceed on multiple fronts,
including longer-term research visits so that some members of the Chinese team can
develop real expertise; a series of workshops that allows the main matters to be
explored more widely over time; and regular, informal exchanges among the
project's leading figures.
7. The role of the U.S. government in such efforts is limited. Most of the actual
cooperative law reform work is best done outside of the government for two
reasons: First, much of the actual legal expertise that the Chinese want exists
outside of our government. But more importantly, the U.S.-China government-togovernment relationship is so volatile and affected by mutual wariness that I think
Chinese counterparts will simply trust U.S. NGOs more and be more open with
them, and projects with U.S. NGOs are less likely to be thrown off track if there are
disruptions in the government-to-government relationship. This is not to argue
against U.S. Government funding for such work, which is a practical necessity. But
it does argue for the U.S. Government not to do the actual cooperative work itself
and for it to let the people it funds do their work for the most part as independent
actors.
8. This kind of cooperative work must be done in a spirit of multiple humilities.
U.S. experts should remember that U.S. practices are not the only alternative that
the Chinese are considering. The Chinese are interested in how we do it, of course,
but they are also interested in how the Germans, Japanese, British, Singaporeans,
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Hong Kongers and Taiwanese do it (among others).28 And of course they are
making reforms that have to fit the distinctive Chinese context. The best U.S.
experts in this kind of work explain the rangeof choices open to the Chinese, admit
shortcomings in our way of doing things as well as the advantages, and learn as
much as possible about the Chinese context before giving advice.
9. We must accept uncertainties. Things are in great flux in China. There are
reformers everywhere, and there are people trying to limit reforms everywhere as
well. The boundaries of the possible are not set and are probably unknowable. The
best people we work with in China are those who are very savvy about the
possibilities, but are pushing the envelope, and who themselves sometimes do not
knowjust how far the reforms can go. For some foreigners, this uncertainty can be
frustrating, but for me it is sometimes the most exciting part of the work watching our Chinese counterparts looking for their own targets of opportunity,
testing the boundaries, taking chances, and on the very best days, sharing with us
their own uncertainties and their own strategies.
10. The last lesson is probably the most important. We need to recognize that
this is difficult and long-term work. To achieve true legal reform, even to
approximate a minimum conception of the rule of law, and to build a public culture
that values and supports it, is a truly vast task. If in the end it proves successful, it
almost surely will take a long time; disillusionment is all but guaranteed if one looks
for quick success. Hopefulness derives from the sense that changes that seem slow
to a participant may in fact be rather rapid in the perspective of history - and
China's changes in the last twenty-four years do seem rapid when viewed in
historian's time. Thus, I have spoken here largely as an optimist. But no one
should underestimate the complexities and difficulties of trying to advance legal
reform in China. And the outcome of these efforts is by no means certain.

A variety of other governments in addition to the United States now support and fund
programs and activities with China in the legal field, at times at financial levels that
significantly exceed the U.S. Congress' recent appropriation, including: Australia, Canada,
Denmark, the European Union, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Hong
Kong also has many legal exchanges with the mainland. In addition, international
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and World Bank have given financial support to such efforts, typically
involving experts from a variety of different countries. Law schools in countries other than
the United States also undertake activities and programs in China. For a listing of various
U.S. entities undertaking programs and activities with China in the legal field, see Nat'l
Comm. on U.S.-China Relations, supra note 22.
28

